




Mereological nihilists are faced with a diﬃcult challenge: explaining ordinary talk about
material objects. Popular paraphrase strategies involve plurals, arrangements of particles, or ﬁc-
tions. In this paper, a new paraphrase strategy is put forward that has distinct advantages over
its rivals: it is compatible with gunk and emergent properties of macro-objects. e only as-
sumption is a commitment to a liberal view of the nature of simples; the nihilist must be willing
to accept the possibility of heterogeneous extended simples. e author suggests reinterpreting
the parthood and composition relations as modal. According to this paraphrase, composition
is a kind of counterpart relation. e author shows that one can accept that mereological ni-
hilism is metaphysically necessary, while endorsing all the claims of classical mereology. As a
result, the nihilists are in exactly the same position as the classical mereologist when it comes
to explaining talk about ordinary objects, but without the additional ontology.
: mereology, nihilism, paraphrase, composition, simples, gunk, parts, counter-
parts, emergent properties.
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   
Some philosophers do not believe in composition.¹ ey ascribe to mereological nihilism, the
view that composition never occurs. But our ordinary way of speaking about the world is rife with
talk of composite objects. Typically nihilists attempt to show how ordinary language about com-
posite objects can be paraphrased in a more strict or fundamental language without composites. But
it is not enough to merely mimic ordinary object talk; we frequently talk about objects being com-
posed of other objects, of objects being parts of other objects. Nihilists have a burden to paraphrase
mereological talk in a way that preserves its utility to ordinary speakers.
e aim of this paper is to provide a paraphrase strategy for themereological nihilist that achieves
both: to mimic talk of ordinary objects and their mereological relations. I do this by borrowing
techniques originally developed in literature on persistence and the problem of change. Broadly
speaking, the approach exploits a rough analogy between modality and temporality. Nihilists ought
to reinterpret mereology as involving modal claims — claims relating to objects in diﬀerent worlds
— while maintaining that at no world does composition occur. On this view, composition and
parthood are reduced to counterpart relations. e result, I argue, is that mereological nihilists
can, without appeal to composites, ﬁnd a way of saying everything the classical mereologist can say.
is approach has marked advantages over rival paraphrase strategies: it can handle cases involving
‘gunk’ and ‘emergent’ properties of objects.
In §, I lay the groundwork for the paraphrase strategy, detailing some background suppositions
involving extended simples. In §, I present a way of interpreting mereological relations as modal
claims involving objects at ‘duplicate’ worlds. In §, I show that this interpretation satisﬁes the
axioms of classical mereology and explain how the approach can be modiﬁed to allow for gunk. In
§, I show how to extend this paraphrase to talk about ordinary material objects and modify it to
allow for emergent properties of objects.
¹Wheeler [], Unger [], Rosen and Dorr [], Cameron [], and recently Sider []. Partial nihilists include van
Inwagen [], Merricks [].
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 Nihilism and Extended Simples
Let us say that an object is simple iﬀ it has no proper parts. Atomism is the view that everything is
simple; and mereological nihilists are atomists.
Simples are generally assumed to be small; they are located in the smallest possible regions of
space. ey might be point-sized (or planck-sized) particles of microphysics. e thought that
simples are small is so natural philosophers often presuppose it without comment.²
But recently the smallness of simples has come under attack. Some have argued for the pos-
sibility of extended simples.³ Indeed, some nihilists believe the world to be made up of only one
universe-sized simple or perhaps many ordinary-object-sized simples.⁴ ese debates crucially de-
pend on the relation between mereology and location. From a purely mereological perspective, the
essential feature of simples is that they have no proper parts — not how big or small they are.
Among those who accept the possibility of extended simples, there is further disagreement over
the possibility of heterogeneous extended simples — simples that qualitatively diﬀer from themselves
(perhaps along their temporal or spatial axes).⁵ I do not wish to weigh in on either of the above
debates here. For the purposes of this paper, I simply assume the possibility of heterogeneous
extended simples. I wish to show that nihilists who accept the possibility of heterogeneous extended
simples have an added advantage: they have a straightforward way of paraphrasing talk of ordinary
material objects and their mereological relations.
²Perhaps the guiding thought is this: suppose an object o were to occupy an extended (non-point-sized) region of
space R. But since R is extended, it has some proper subregion R0. But since o occupies R, it must also (partly) occupy
R0; it does so by virtue of having a proper part o0 that fully occupies R0. us o is not simple.
Of course, this line of argument for the smallness of simples relies on an implicit appeal to   
 , something which is independently controversial (see van Inwagen []). But even philosophers
sensitive to this controversy often slide freely between simplicity and smallness. Consider van Inwagen []:
If this answer [nihilism] is correct, then (if the current physics is to be believed) the physical world
consists entirely of quarks, leptons, and bosons — there is just nothing else in it for these particles have
no parts and they never add up to anything bigger. ()
³See Markosian [] and McDaniel []. See also Simons [].
⁴Schaﬀer [] and Rea [] are good examples of existence monists. See also Markosian [] the emergent nihilism
of Williams [].
⁵McDaniel [] and Parsons [] both accept them. Spencer [] argues against.
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Before moving on, however, there is a basic problem with heterogeneous extended simples that
deserves consideration. Assuming the indiscernibility of identicals, how could something diﬀer
from itself without contradiction?
Fortunately, there are a number of diﬀerent proposals already in the literature, many of which
were originally developed in the literature on persistence. e ﬁrst proposal is due toHawthorne and
Cortens []. ey suggest what they call ‘feature-placing’ language according to which properties
may be ‘placed’ without requiring a subject (for example: “It is raining here”).⁶ A second approach
is related to adverbial accounts of instantiation, where the instantiation of a property is relative to
a given region.⁷ A third approach is due to Sider [] who gives an account of located properties
using ‘statespace structures’.⁸ A fourth approach due to Parsons [] suggests there are fundamental
‘distributional properties’ like being polka-dotted.
A ﬁnal approach due to Ehring [] (and extended byMcDaniel []) was developed as a solution
to Lewis’s problem of temporary intrinsics; it involves relativising properties to regions of spacetime.
is is the approach to be used in what follows (although it may well be that any of the above
approaches could be used). e crux of Ehring and McDaniel’s proposal is to appeal to short-lived
and highly localised tropes which are instantaneous and unextended. We can classify these tropes
by their resemblance to other tropes in the typical nominalist way. Here are the conditions under
which objects instantiate properties at times and at regions.
temporal instantiation x is F at t iﬀ x exempliﬁes an F-trope existing at time t.
regional instantiation x is F at r iﬀ x exempliﬁes an F-trope existing at r.
To see how these clauses work, consider a half-red and half-blue object x.
⁶See also the developments in Turner [].
⁷See Lewis [] for criticisms of this proposal as adopted by endurantists.
⁸Sider develops the approach for a special case of heterogeneous extended simples — the world of the monist —
but the approach might be adapted more generally.
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Now, by hypothesis, x is a simple wholly located at the region r1[ r2. Yet, x is red at r1 and x is blue
at r2 by virtue of exemplifying red tropes in r1 and blue tropes in r2. at is, x need not have proper
parts exactly occupying r1 or r2 for it to diﬀer from itself. All this is, of course, consistent with the
indiscernibility of identicals, since x = y even if x is red at r1 and y is blue at r2. On the Ehring-
McDaniel proposal, qualitative heterogeneity across space consists in exemplifying non-resembling
localised tropes at diﬀerent spatial regions.
 e Paraphrase Strategy
Mereological relations are usually interpreted as extensional: as holding between objects at a world.
I propose that nihilists should interpret mereological relations as intensional: as holding between
objects in diﬀerent worlds.
e application to mereology is new, but the general strategy should be familiar. Sider’s []
stage-theoretic approach to the problem of persistence does away with the need for a temporal parts
ontology by employing counterpart relations between stages at diﬀerent times.⁹ By analogy, this
approach does away with the need for amaterial parts ontology by employing counterpart relations
between objects at diﬀerent worlds.
I begin with an example to guide intuitions before setting out the proposal in detail. Imagine a
world w inhabited by only one heterogeneous extended simple: a table. Because the table is simple,
there are no other parts in that world, and in particular no subatomic particles. Now imagine
⁹Of course, Sider accepts (or, at least did at the time) the temporal parts ontology, but for other reasons. Stage
theory does not require it.
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another world w0 with a number of simple subatomic particles arranged in such a way as to appear
exactly like the table in w. To a ﬁrst approximation, w and w0 have a lot in common; indeed, the
distribution of properties across spacetime is the same. In one sense (to be speciﬁed shortly) w and
w0 are duplicate worlds. Both worlds are nihilistically acceptable, since they contain only simples.
But it is also natural to think that the relationship between the particles in w0 and the table in w is
signiﬁcantly like the ordinary notions of parthood and composition. is is the core idea behind the
paraphrase strategy to be explored in below.
So what, exactly, is in common between our table world w and the particle world w0? Here, the
Ehring-McDaniel proposal can help. Let us represent the commonalities between these two worlds
with point-property arrays, or ‘P-arrays’ for short.
p-array A is a P-array iﬀ A is a non-empty set of spacetime points with a speciﬁc distribution of
instantaneous localised tropes.
You should think of a P-array as modelling the external world as it exists abstracting away from what
things there are. ey should not to be thought of as worlds, as worlds are full of material objects.
To use a common metaphor, worlds have ‘joints’; they have objective structure. is additional
structure can be modelled via partitions on P-arrays. ¹⁰
partition A set P of non-empty sets is a partition of A if: (i) P covers all of A (i.e.
S
P = A); and
(ii) the members of P are pairwise disjoint (i.e. pi \ pj = ; for any pi and pj in P s.t. i 6= j).
A partition ‘carves up’ a P-array into disjoint regions. Partitioning a P-array is a way of locating
objects within it. Members of a given partition — ‘blocks’ — are regions occupied by material
objects.
Condition (i) guarantees that in any partition, every point in a P-array is included in some block
and hence, every region of spacetime is covered. Without (i), we would be modelling portions of
worlds, or merely some but not all of the objects that exist at a world. Condition (ii) rules out the
¹⁰at P-arrays are carved up via partitions is importantly related to Schaﬀer’s [] tiling constraint.
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same point featuring in more than one block. Without (ii), distinct objects would be allowed to
reside in overlapping regions of spacetime. But nihilists typically reject the existence of overlapping
objects.¹¹
Furthermore, (i) and (ii) are the only conditions to be imposed on worldly structure. at is, I
will assume a basic principle of plenitude principle about worlds:
world If A is a P-array, P any partition on A, and D a domain of objects located at regions in P,
then the triple w = hA; P;Di is a world.
Every possible partition on every possible P-array represents a possible world. is codiﬁes the
thought that the world could have been individuated diﬀerently than it is — it might have had
a diﬀerent structure than it has. We might have lived in a monistic world, with the very same
point-trope distributions. is possible world is given by the coarsest partition on our P-array A
with a single-object domain. Or, we might have lived in a pointy atomistic world along the lines of
traditional atomists, represented by the ﬁnest partition on our P-array. Or it might have been that
the world is individuated into a domain of middle-sized objects like tables and chairs, represented
by a mid-grade partition.
It is worth emphasising that these worlds are guaranteed to be nihilistically acceptable. e fact
that worlds are modelled by partitions implies that if r1 and r2 are members of the same partition,
then r1 is not a proper subregion of r2, nor is r2 a proper subregion of r1. As we will see below, this
constraint is important to guarantee that at no world is anything a proper part of anything else; that
is, it ensures that at no world does composition occur.¹²
It is clear that worlds may be have diﬀerent objects occupying diﬀerent regions but be otherwise
¹¹It is natural to think that objects which overlap spatially overlap mereologically. is is further explored in Schaf-
fer’s [] defense of the tiling constraint. But see Williams [] for a nihilistic view which allows for completely co-
incident material objects. It is unclear whether the paraphrase strategy below could be adapted to handle cases of
coincidence. One possibility is to use ‘divisions’ induced by similarity relations instead of partitions a là Hazen and
Humberstone [].
¹²Various people (including an anonymous referee) have asked whether the existence of regions and subregions makes
for something like a parthood relation that would be unacceptable to the nihilist. I don’t think it does, since we needn’t
be committed to the literal existence of regions; the paraphrase strategy could easily function using only pluralities of
space-time points rather than their regions together with the standard plural-logical ‘is one of ’ relation.
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indistinguishable. ese worlds exhibit the very same pattern of distribution of tropes across points
in spacetime — they are ‘duplicates’.
p-duplicate wi and wj are P-duplicates iﬀ they are partitions on the same P-array.
But just as worlds can be P-duplicates, so too can objects in those worlds be counterparts.
Let the denotation of a singular term x at world w (written _xw) be a member of the domain
of objects D. e location of an object denoted by a singular term x at world w (written jxjw) is
a region of the P-array for w. For plural terms, the denotation of xx at world w (written _xxw) is a
subset of domain D. Moreover, the location of an object denoted by a plural term xx at a world w
(written jxxjw) is a collection of regions in the P-array for w.
We are now able to deﬁne P-counterparthood.
p-counterpart _xxwi and _yywj are P-counterparts iﬀ wi and wj are P-duplicates, and
S jxxjwi =S jyyjwj .
Roughly, some objects are P-counterparts of some other objects whenever they (collectively) occupy
the same region of the same P-array. e idea behind this notion of counterparthood is that objects
located at the same region of a given P-array have the very same trope distributions, and hence
inherit similar properties. Going back to our simple table world and the particle world: these
worlds are qualitatively indistinguishable even if the occupants of that world are diﬀerent.
Ordinarily, counterparthood is a binary relation between single objects. e P-counterpart
relation, however, is multigrade: a binary relation between either single objects or pluralities of
objects. e simple table and the particles are an example of one-many counterpart relation.¹³
¹³An anonymous referee points to another proposal — the   from Williams [, §.] (Williams cites
Schwarz [] as the original source of the idea). e   exploits counterpart-theoretic tools to give a
paraphrase strategy for “gavagai” involving undetached rabbit parts. A main diﬀerence is that the   involves
a number of primitive binary counterpart relations that hold between two things if e.g. they are parts of the same rabbit.
is severs the connection between counterpart relations and qualitative similarity. On my proposal, there is a single
multigrade counterpart relation that is reducible to qualitative similarity between space-time regions (as above), and
hence we do not need any counterpart-theoretic primitives. Still the   is interesting, and worthy of more
consideration than I can give it here.
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With the notions of P-duplication and P-counterparthood on board, we can proceed to inter-
pret mereological talk. First, consider sentences involving the parthood relation. e following
paraphrase can be constructed:
part ‘x is part of y’ is correct at w0 iﬀ there are worlds w1 and w2 such that they are P-duplicates of
w0, and jxjw1  jyjw2 .
So, nihilists can paraphrase parthood claims as claims involving objects at diﬀerent worlds: it is
correct to say that an object is part of another just if it occupies a subregion of a world duplicate to
our own.
Secondly, proper parthood and overlap can then be paraphrased in straightforward ways:
proper part ‘x is a proper part of y’ is correct at w0 iﬀ there are worlds w1 and w2 such that they
are P-duplicates of w0, and jxjw1  jyjw2 and jxjw1 6= jyjw2 .
overlap ‘x overlaps y’ is true at w0 iﬀ there are worlds w1 and w2 such that they are P-duplicates of
w0, and the intersection jxjw1 \ jyjw2 is non-empty.
Notice that proper parthood is always relation between objects at diﬀerent worlds. is is a con-
sequence of properties of partitions; at no world are there objects occupying subregions of regions
occupied by other objects, as this would violate clause (ii) of  above. It follows, then,
that objects are always and everywhere simple in the sense that, strictly and literally speaking, they
have no proper parts. For similar reasons, mereological overlap is a transworld relation when it is
non-trivial — in cases where two distinct objects overlap.¹⁴
Lastly, to paraphrase the composition relation we utilise plural variables.
compose ‘xx compose y’ is correct at w0 iﬀ there are worlds w1 and w2 such that they are P-
duplicates of w0, and _xxw1 and _yw2 are P-counterparts.
¹⁴It may not be immediately obvious from the clause above that overlap satisﬁes the typical mereological deﬁnition:
x overlaps y oﬀ there is some z that is part of x and part of y. One can see, however, that the above paraphrase implies
that there is a non-empty region where both objects are (partially) located. By the plenitude principle on worlds, there
is some P-duplicate world to w0 in which that region is occupied by a single object _z. And from this, it follows that ‘z
is part of x’ and ‘z is part of y’ are both correct.
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Composition then is P-counterparthood. It is correct to say that some things compose another
whenever the former objects collectively occupy the same region as the latter at duplicate worlds.
e only time composition holds within a world is the trivial case of an object composing itself.
Non-trivial composition is always transworld ; as such, mereological nihilism is necessarily true.
 Recovering Classical Mereology (Including Gunk!)
It remains to be shown that the above deﬁnitions and corresponding paraphrases can recover the
full power of classical mereology. Before proving the result in full generality, I will run through a
basic example to show how the above proposal generates the required mereological structure; after
which those readers uninterested in following the proofs may skip them.
For our example, consider the three-elementmodel of classical mereology below. Upward arrows
indicate proper parthood. As proper parthood is transitive, if an objectmay be reached by a sequence















For simplicity, we will assume that a, b, and c are all point-sized, occupying the points a^, b^, and c^
respectively. In this case, our P-array would be A = fa^; b^; c^g and jajw0 = fa^g, jbjw0 = fb^g, and
jcjw0 = f^cg. Worlds are generated by the following partitions on A:
• w0 = ffa^g; fb^g; f^cgg
• w1 = ffa^g; fb^; c^gg
• w2 = ffa^; b^g; f^cgg
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• w3 = ffa^; c^g; fb^gg
• w4 = ffa^; b^; c^gg
Object a in the three-element model of classical mereology is located at the region fa^g, object a+b
at fa^; b^g, etc. To see that these worlds exhibit the right mereological structure, we need to check
that in every case where ‘x is a proper part of y’ is true in the model of mereology (i.e. every x and
y connected by arrows), there are corresponding worlds in which x is located in a subregion of y.
Suppose we want to check whether it is correct to say ‘a + b is a proper part of a + b + c’ at w0.
Paraphrasing, we need to check that there are worlds w and w0 such that they are P-duplicates of
w0, and ja+ bjw  ja+ b+ cjw0 and ja+ bjw 6= ja+ b+ cjw0 . But w2 and w4 are respectively just
such worlds. I leave it to the reader to conﬁrm visually all remaining proper parthood claims.
Turning now to the fully general result: it can be shown that the paraphrases of mereological
relations can be shown to satisfy all the axioms of classical extensional mereology.
(ma) Reﬂexivity: x is part of x.
(ma) Antisymmetry: if x is part of y and y part of x, then x is identical to y.
(ma) Transitivity: if x is part of y and y part of z, then x is part of z.
(ma) Strong Supplementation: if x is not part of y, then there is some z such that z is part of x and
does not overlap y.
(ma) Unrestricted Composition: for any xx, there is some y such that any z overlaps y iﬀ z overlaps
one of xx.
I prove each axiom in turn. For (), ‘x is part of x’ is correct at @ iﬀ there are worlds w1 and w2
such that they are P-duplicates of @, and jxjw1  jxjw2 . Letting w1 = w2, jxjw1  jxjw1 .
For (), assume there are worlds w1 and w2 each P-duplicating @ such that jxjw1  jyjw2
and some worlds w3 and w4 each P-duplicating @ such that jyjw3  jxjw4 . Since w1–w4 are all
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P-duplicates of @, they are P-duplicates of each other. In that case, jxjw1 = jxjw4 and jyjw2 = jyjw3 .
Substituting, we have it that jxjw1 = jyjw2 and jxjw4 = jyjw3 , etc. So, they are located in the same
region of the P-array at the relevant worlds. Does this mean they are ‘identical’? Well, this depends
on how one is to paraphrase talk about ‘identity’ in the context of mereology. According to the
current paraphrase strategy, ‘identity’ ought to be interpreted as a transworld identity relation — or
at least something identity-like: P-counterparthood.¹⁵
For (), assume w1, w2 are P-duplicates of @, such that jxjw1  jyjw2 and w3 and w4 are
P-duplicates of @ such that jyjw3  jzjw4 . Since w2 and w3 are P-duplicates of @, they are P-
duplicates of each other. In that case, jyjw2 = jyjw3 . en by the transitivity of the subset relation
on A, jxjw1  jzjw3 .
To prove (), assume that ‘x is not part of y’ is correct. Paraphrasing the antecedent, there
are no P-duplicate worlds in which jxj  jyj. So ﬁx any two P-duplicate worlds w1 and w2 at which
_x and _y exist; we know that jxjw1 6 jyjw2 . Now let jzj be the set of all points in jxjw1 not in jyjw2 .
Notice jzj  jxjw1 and the intersection of jzj and jyjw2 is empty. us, ‘z is part of x and does not
overlap y’ is correct, as required. But does jzj exist at some P-duplicate world w3? Yes, since every
subset of the P-array A is a member of some possible partition on A, by the plenitude principle jzjw3
exists, as does _zw3 .
To show that () holds, we want to show that ‘xx compose y’ is correct for arbitrary xx.
Paraphrasing, we want there to be some w1 and w2 such that jyjw2 =
S jxxjw1 . Since jxxjw1 is a set
of members of the partition P on A,
S jxxjw1 is a subset of A. But any subset of A is a member of
some possible partition P0 on A. By the plenitude principle, there is some world w2 in which jyj
exists. Set theory guarantees that for any jzj, jzj \ jxxjw1 is non-empty iﬀ jzj \ jyjw2 is non-empty.
Hence, ‘z overlaps y iﬀ z overlaps one of the xx’ is correct, as required. And so we have it that
composition, paraphrased as a relation between worlds, is unrestricted even though composition
within a world never occurs.
¹⁵Cotnoir [] shows how treating distinct but mutual parts as equivalents recaptures the full strength of the anti-
symmetry axiom. A similar approach could be used here.
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Now, classical mereology is consistent with there being no atoms at all. But on our above
proposal, proper parthood chains will always bottom out in an ‘atomic’ world— the world in which
objects are located according to the ﬁnest partition. But this is an inessential feature of the approach;
we needn’t have assumed that every possible partition will give acceptable locations for objects.
Indeed, one might have thought that some regions (e.g. pointy ones) are not adequate locations for
ordinary objects. We might, for instance, allow only certain types of regions as admissible locations
for objects.¹⁶ One natural approach allows for the possibility of atomless gunk.¹⁷
e key idea is to endow the set A of spacetime points in a P-array with a topology.¹⁸ Given a
topological space, we can use notions of the interior (written ‘i(X)’), and closure (written ‘c(X)’) of a
region.¹⁹ We say a region X is open iﬀ it is identical with its interior, i(X) = X. A region is closed iﬀ
it is identical with its closure, c(X) = X. Furthermore, an open set X is regular open iﬀ i(c(X)) = X;
a closed set X is regular closed iﬀ c(i(X)) = X.²⁰
If we allow only regular open regions as possible locations of objects, we can recapture ‘gunk’
using our paraphrase technique. We just need to tweak some of the deﬁnitions as follows:
partition* A set P of non-empty sets is a partition* of A if: (i) c(
S
P) = A; and (ii) the members
of P are regular open sets such that pi \ pj = ; for any pi and pj in P s.t. i 6= j).




¹⁶For more debate over possible ‘receptacles’ for objects, see Cartwright [], Uzquiano [], and Hudson [, ch. ].
e approach below is a variant of Tarski’s [] gunky models for mereology.
¹⁷anks to Agustìn Rayo for raising the question as to whether the approach can handle gunk.
¹⁸A topological space is any set A together with a set of its subsets O  }(A) satisfying the following conditions:
. ; and A are both in O
. If O  O, then SO is in O.
. If O1; : : : ;On are in O, then O1 \ : : : \ On is in O.
e members of the collection O are the open sets. e complement of an open set is closed. We’ll call the set of all
closed sets C.
¹⁹e interior of a set X is the largest open set contained in X: i(X) =
SfO 2 O : O  Ag. e closure of a set X is
the smallest closed set containing X: c(X) =
TfC 2 C : A  Cg.
²⁰Not all open sets are regular open, e.g. the complement of a point x in Euclidean -space with the standard
topology; likewise not all closed sets are regular closed, e.g. the surface of a sphere in -space.
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We then plug in the starred versions of these into the remaining deﬁnitions. We can now show
that MA–MA hold by generalising the above proofs.²¹ And importantly, we will vindicate the
possibility of gunk, since for every object x in some world wi, there will be some P-duplicate world
wj in which there is a y such that jyjwj is a proper subset of jxjwi . at’s because every regular open
region has another regular open as a proper subset.²² e fact that we can recover gunk is a marked
advantage of this paraphrase strategy over virtually every other approach.²³
 Recovering Ordinary Talk (Including Emergence!)
I claim that nihilists are in no more diﬃcult a position in paraphrasing ordinary talk about parthood
and composition than are classical mereologists. We can extend this nihilistic interpretation of
mereology to a full-ﬂedged paraphrase for all talk of ordinary material objects.
Consider a sentence like: “e table is brown.” Now, either there is a table in the actual world
or there is not. If there is, then according to the above view, tables are heterogeneous extended
simples and can have properties like being brown. Here we can simply co-opt the Ehring-McDaniel
  deﬁnition above: the table is brown at r iﬀ the table exempliﬁes brown-
tropes existing at r. In this case, then, there is no need for paraphrase. If there are no actual tables,
but merely particles arranged-table-wise, then by the plenitude principle on worlds there is some
P-duplicate world to the actual world in which there really are tables with properties like being
brown. And so, in correctly saying that the ‘the table is brown’, we are actually saying something
about a speciﬁc region of our world that would be literally true at the very same region at the relevant
²¹For : we cannot in general use jxj n jyj as our witness for z in MA, since jxj n jyj is not always regular open
when jxj and jyj are. Example: take the regular open intervals jxj = (0; 1) and jyj = (:5; 1); then jxj n jyj = (0; :5]
which is not regular open — i(c((0; :5]) = (0; :5). So, we need a diﬀerent witness. Fortunately, jxj n c(jyj) will do, as
it is always regular open, and disjoint from jxj.
For : we just need to show that for any non-empty subset S of locations, jzj\jyj 6= ; iﬀ jxj 2 S and jzj\jxj 6= ;.
We cannot in general use jyj = S S, since it’s not always the case that unions of regular open sets are regular open.
Example: (0; :5) [ (:5; 1) is not regular open even if each of them is. However, if we let jyj = i(c(S S)), we have the
result.
²²For example, imagine a sphere with radius  without its surface. Now, there are uncountably manymore surfaceless
spheres with smaller radii contained in it. Is the centre point of the sphere in the domain? No. ere are no point-sized
regions, since they any such region will be closed and so not an admissible location.
²³Although, see Williams [] for a diﬀerent attempt to simulate gunk.
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duplicate world.
More explicitly:
instantiation ‘x is F at r’ is correct at w0 iﬀ there is a world w1 P-duplicating w0 in which and
r  jxjw1 and an F-trope exists at r.
In the special case where _x exists at w0, we can allow w0 = w1. I allow r to be a subset of the
location of _x simply because I want to allow for extended objects to instantiate properties in proper
subregions of their locations (after all, they might be heterogeneous). In the case of a completely
brown table, r might well be identical to jxjw1 . We thus get a very simple account of what it is
for there to be ‘some particles arranged table-wise’: particles are arranged table-wise just if they are
P-counterparts to a table!
e above approach raises a natural question: what sorts of properties can these material objects
have? e answer given so far: whichever properties it inherits from the tropes at the relevant regions
of the P-array. But how could such tropes determine all the properties of every object occupying
that region? For example, consider again our simple table, and suppose it is heavy. Do properties
like being heavy exist? Could being heavy be determined by perfectly resembling (mass) tropes? If
so, the view appears to be committed to a version of  , at least insofar
as the properties had by macro-objects are completely determined by the properties (in this case,
tropes) associated with the points they occupy.²⁴
I think this is merely an artefact of the Ehring-McDaniel account of properties; it may not be
the case for the other accounts of property instantiation compatible with heterogeneous extended
simples discussed in §. But even still, the Ehring-McDaniel approach could be revised to allow for
failures of the relevant version of  . ere might be emergent properties of
objects that are not determined by associated tropes. To allow for this, we would need to supplement
²⁴anks to an anonymous referee for raising this question. On the other hand, the proposal obviously ﬂouts
  in a diﬀerent way. A typical way of stating the thesis is: no two worlds diﬀer at all without
some corresponding diﬀerence in the arrangement of qualities. But worlds on this proposal clearly diﬀer by virtue of
the objects that exist there, even though their arrangement of qualities (i.e. P-array) stays the same.
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our earlier deﬁnition of a world from triples w = hA; P;Di to quadruples w = hA; P;D;Ei where
E here is a set of emergent properties whose bearers are members of the domain.²⁵
If worlds of this sort are allowed, then sentences like ‘e table is heavy’ can be paraphrased,
even if being heavy is an emergent property. On this view, ‘e table is heavy’ is correct iﬀ there is
some world P-duplicating ours in which there is a table (in D) and it bears the property of being
heavy (in E).
 Concluding Remarks
Mereological nihilists are faced with a diﬃcult challenge: explaining ordinary talk about material
objects and their mereological relations. I have put forward a new paraphrase — the counterpart
strategy — that has distinct advantages over its rivals. e main assumption is a commitment
to a liberal view of the nature of simples; the nihilist must be willing to accept the possibility of
heterogeneous extended simples. As a result, the mereological nihilist can accept that her position is
metaphysically necessary, and yet can endorse the correctness of all the claims of classical mereology,
including paraphrases involving gunky worlds. Nihilists, then, are in exactly the same position
as the classical mereologist when it comes to explaining talk about ordinary objects, but without
the additional ontology. In addition, the nihilist can paraphrase lots of other ordinary claims as
well, potentially including claims about macro-sized objects that have emergent properties. ese
advantages are signiﬁcant enough to make the proposal worthy of serious consideration. Whether
the counterpart paraphrase strategy faces other problems remains to be seen. ²⁶
²⁵anks to Jessica Wilson and Benj Hellie for pressing me to get clearer on this point.
²⁶anks to Don Baxter, Björn Brodowski, Tim Elder, Gerry Hough, Aidan McGlynn, David Nicolas, and four
anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. anks also to audiences at the University of
Toronto (especially Imogen Dickie, Benj Hellie, Jessica Wilson, and Byeong-Uk Yi), the Metaphysical Indeterminacy
Workshop at the University of Leeds (especially Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron, Agustìn Rayo, Jason Turner, and
Robbie Williams), the University of St Andrews (especially Derek Ball, Ephraim Glick, Patrick Greenough, Katherine
Hawley, and Simon Prosser), and the  Modality Workshop at Stockholm University (especially Fabrice Correia,
Andy Egan, Dan López de Sa, Peter Pagin, Sven Rosenkrantz, and Elia Zardini) for stimulating discussion of these
ideas.
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